

Development Strategies in Africa

**Current Economic, Socio-Political,
and Institutional Trends and Issues**

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Participation, Pluralism and Pervasive Poverty: Better Governance and Human Development in Sub-Saharan Africa

REGINALD HERBOLD GREEN

"The small boy who breaks a pot goes to tell his mother 'The pot got broken.' Not 'I broke the pot' but 'it got broken.' . . . And who did this? We did. We broke the pot."

**- Jerry John Rawlings
President of Ghana**

Opportunities should be given to women for greater participation in the nation's political and decision-making processes at all levels, especially at the national centres of power.

There should be greater openness in the process of designing the adjustment package, both within government and beyond. In particular, employers, trade unions and other relevant groups should be closely associated with the process both to improve the design of the programs and to ensure their fuller understanding and support...

In making the protection of the poor an integral part of adjustment, the primary strategy should be that of enhancing their productive capacity through better access to productive resources and assets...

- Khartoum Declaration

PLURALISM REVISITED

Pluralism is a less-than-satisfactory term to use with respect to Sub-Saharan Africa unless specifically defined for that purpose. The reason is its near monopolization by a specific formulation related to the conditions of a particular secular/Christian, industrial, high-income, bourgeois democratic society/polity (the United States).

Participatory pluralism is defined for purposes of this chapter as including

1. participation in preparation and dialogue leading to decisions as well as in articulation, implementation, monitoring, review, and modification;
2. ability and practice of, self-organization at levels ranging from basic community (village, neighborhood, workplace) to national; and
3. accountability of leaders and officials both to the people who directly or indirectly choose them and to those they are intended to serve/lead.

Possibly good governance (a la World Bank's "Long Term Study") or participation (a la UNECA's "transformation" studies and its Abuja, Khartoum, and Arusha 1987-1990 Conferences).

This definition does not define specific structures. For example, a single-party system does not per se mark a polity/civil society as nonplural if a variety of organizations with participation, ability to act and to speak on behalf of their members, and leadership accountable to those members exist. If these conditions are met, the affiliation of such organizations to the single party may be quite consistent with pluralism.

All three elements are required. Genuine participation's absence clearly prevents pluralism even if there are multiple, autonomous organizations. But genuine participation can be practiced within monolithic structures with at least substantial accountability. If these structures either englobe and control or forbid the existence of other structures and institutions, then they are clearly not pluralist however participatory, accountable, and majority supported they may be.

Ability to practice of self-organization unless it includes membership participation, selection of and accountability of leaders is not enough to demonstrate pluralism. Some organizations, for example, religious bodies and heavily state or party directed trade unions, are hierarchical with largely self-perpetuating leaderships accountable to themselves or to reference groups other than their members.

Clearly the definition presented is in the form of an "ideal type construct." No civil society/polity is or ever has been fully participatory pluralist. The issues in the analysis of any actual case are how wide and deep participatory pluralist practices are and what (both in form and in substance) and of what kind (e.g.,

legal, political, informational, real resources, political economic) are the main obstacles to broadening and deepening.

PLURALISM IN AFRICA

There is a tendency in Western and perhaps not only Western scholarship to see both past and present African societies/polities as neither participatory nor pluralist. This appears to result partly from rather superficial study (especially of the precolonial period) and the use of competitive, multiparty electoral systems as a litmus test.

Many precolonial African polities were participatory to a substantial extent. In some at least particular interest groups or subclasses were self-organized and had spokespersons within the political process. (That others were excluded e.g., slaves and often women, demonstrates limits on pluralism not its total absence). Many groups, for example age groups (often parallel but separate ones for females and for males), religious bodies, economic groupings (including what could be styled merchants and artisans guilds) usually existed, had powers and functions of their own, and were to some degree accountable. The hereditary principle was, in practice, by no means totally inconsistent with participation and accountability. The selecting, in most cases, was from a range of candidates who could be picked without being seen to violate the hereditary principle. Recall further that a fairly draconian form of accountability was frequently institutionalized, for example, "destooling" and "deskinning" in most coastal, forest, and savannah Ghanaian polities. Except for political leadership, the hereditary principle was far from universal, for example, it does not appear to have applied to age groups.

Present African civil societies and polities do have multiple organizations, albeit that their number, diversity, freedom or space to act, and degree of outside control vary widely. The area of political parties is the only one in which this is rarely true. Mainland Sub-Saharan Africa, in practice, has had difficulty to experience competitive, multiparty systems in which a transfer of power by a victory of the opposition parties is a credible, present possibility.

At the national level, the main organizations with societal functions are usually religious, labor (more specifically, trade union), women's, and (less uniformly) cooperatives. Peasant organizations with broad bases and significant functions/influence are quite uncommon. A range of other bodies for example, St. John's Ambulance Society, Boy Scouts, usually exist but are largely urban and narrowly middle class/Westernized in their memberships. Others, for example National Red Cross Societies, are common but vary from substantially participatory, accountable, and self-defining as to program (e.g., Mozambique) to de facto statal entities. Locational or home origin groups appear to be less significant than in the past, especially beyond mobilizing support for (or from)

their home districts or localities. In that sense, they are becoming less national and more regional or local.

The range at the regional level is probably analogous to that at the national level. At the local (basic community) level, there is usually a greater degree of complexity and more organizations. Some are adapted forms of traditional organizations (e.g., age groups and in some cases formally superseded hereditary political groupments). Others, for example peasants, coops, women's groups, are parallel but lack connection to national organizational structures.

Exclusively ethnic based systems, whether traditional or manipulated, do not constitute pluralism. If they seek *de facto* separation from, let alone dominance over the state (e.g., Dinka in Sudan, Amhara in Ethiopia) they constitute as grave a rejection of pluralism as of a national state or civil society. As historic location, and culture specific groups which accept pluralist civil societies and states, they can make contributions to pluralistic practice (e.g., Tanzania, perhaps Kenya), especially at home area development and local governance levels. But that is not what high profile "tribalism" and so-called, romanticized legitimate parallel power structures in SSA are about.

African one-party states are not a homogeneous category. They range from mass party ones with highly competitive primaries and substantial nonreselection (e.g. Mozambique, Tanzania) through *de facto* elite (or cadre?) parties with little popular participation or direct civil selection/rejection (e.g., Angola, Côte d'Ivoire) to cases in which the party could as well be called a junta (e.g., Zaire, Benin until very recently). So too the degrees of tolerance of criticism within party and affiliated bodies and, more particularly, from pluralist nonparty bodies or individuals varies tremendously. Despite having a mass party, Zimbabwe's state/party reaction to criticism is frequently jumpy and repressive. Kenya's (with a cross between an elite and a mass party) is more uniformly repressive. The junta one or no party states, predictably, rarely allow any criticism.

That most one party states in Africa are increasingly unstable and provide poor governance is indisputable. But to use Central Europe in 1989–1990 as an analogue to the probable or desirable may be misleading:

1. Overthrow by mass non-consent of any elitist or junta regime is historically and currently not uncommon.
2. Few African one-party states are or ever were in any basic sense Marxist-Leninist. The divergences are not uniform, for example Mozambique's mass party, painstaking competitive elections and acceptance of people's rejection of sitting or potential leaders owes more to Presidents Mondlane and Machel than to Marx or Lenin, whereas the power and position structures of Angola seem to have historic roots in the great black Creole families of late 1890s Luanda whose advance was then aborted by the new Portuguese Republic's concern for *petit blanc* opportunities in the colonies (as well as at home).

3. Some African single parties, via open primaries, provide wider choice of office holders than would systems with one dominant and one or more permanent opposition parties.
4. Regional parties lead to neither stability and normal competitive politics nor to viable national civil societies, and many *de jure* or *de facto* single parties were created to try to overcome this problem, for example, KANU absorption of KADU in Kenya's and ZANU(PF)'s of ZAPU in Zimbabwe.
5. There are cases, (e.g., Tanzania) in which the single party was in fact not necessarily viewed as permanent and there could be an internal dynamic toward multiparty politics.

The military and quasi-military regimes and the no party civil governments are also very varied. Some respond (however problematically) to social and civil patterns with more than elite bases (e.g., Swaziland) and others seek, with limited success, to create alternative participatory structures to European/North Atlantic imports, which clearly provided little accountability or good governance (e.g., Ghana, Nigeria, and, on a favorable reading, Uganda). Others are elite systems of greater or lesser (usually lesser) governing capacity, competence, and civility (e.g., Liberia). The multiparty electoral systems are four: Botswana, Namibia, Gambia, Senegal. Only the first pair operate in a way analogous to the European concept of such states and, barring gross incompetence or betrayal of its civil base, in neither could the governing party lose a majority by election in the foreseeable future.

PERSISTENT POVERTY

Sub-Saharan Africa has never had a high level of achieved productive forces per capita nor a particularly egalitarian income distribution. Therefore, poverty has been both persistent and widespread.

The degrees, immediate causes, and forms of poverty were neither uniform, nor stable before, during, nor after colonialism. With very few exceptions, the achieved productive forces per capita declined, and the proportion of the population in absolute poverty rose from 1979 through 1983. In many (probably a majority) cases, this process of immiserization and/or disintegration has continued. In others, it may have been halted but not reversed and in, perhaps an increasing minority, it has, at least tentatively, been reversed and some ground won back.

The basic causes of the decline vary as to nature or date and as to severity. External economic environment worsening is present in almost all. Its onset varies from the mid-1970s (base metal and sugar export dominated economies) through the turn of the decade (beverage buoyed economies) to the mid-1980s (where petroleum sectors had fueled growth). Drought has been another red

thread running through most. Gross domestic economic (usually paralleled by political) mismanagement outside or verging toward a civil war context has been dominant in some cases, for example, Ghana (1972–1981) and Zaire (1960 →) respectively. External aggression (notably in Southern Africa) and civil or civil cum regional wars (notably in the Horn, Morocco/Saharan Democratic Republic and Uganda) have been the dominant cause in several cases (e.g., Angola, Mozambique, Malawi since 1985, Uganda, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan). Failure to react to other factors with adequate speed, degree, and flexibility is a pervasive characteristic (Zambia, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, and Nigeria are possible examples).

More than one factor has usually been present, and it is their cumulative interaction that has led to the deterioration. For example, Tanzania had extreme terms of trade shocks over 1978–1981; major external aggression and consequential costs at the same period and again from late 1986; drought over 1979–1985; and major policy mistakes (premature and overdone import liberalization 1978–1979, were not fully overcome until 1984 because the process of participatory quasi-pluralist consensus building took eight years)

POVERTY, PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION

Poverty exists personally and at the household level (e.g. entitlement to an adequate diet), communally (e.g., access to basic health and education services), regionally (e.g., marginalization from the national economy), rarely infrastructurally (e.g. transport and communication) and nationally (e.g., low gross domestic product (GDP)/capita and inability to sustain growth).

Therefore, in any assessment of policies, institutions, or societal patterns, productive efficiency matters. Without GDP, food production, and export growth higher than that of population, few or no SSA economies can attain either stable, strong economic structures and processes or substantial, sustained reductions of the number of persons living in absolute poverty.

Distribution is also crucial. The dominant impact on distribution comes from levels and specific structures of production. For example, the strength of trade unions and the institutional patterns of the labor market dominate real wage levels and trends, given output levels, whereas the pattern, support for, and trends in agriculture among small, middle, and large peasants (in the Maoist sense), capitalist-form enterprises (corporate or otherwise) and state or cooperative subsectors is likely to dominate rural income distribution (as well as levels, trends and makeup of agricultural output). However, the production impact on distribution may be indirect. The clearest example is the Botswana diamond sector. Seventy-five percent of gross surplus (itself about 75 percent of gross output) goes to the state, and a substantial portion is used to broaden wage employment, provide near universal access to basic services, and provide part-

time employment and personal consumption supplements to members of poverty focus groups. Communal, infrastructural, and regional poverty (as previously defined) require a catalytic initial and usually a dominant subsequent central government role if they are to be addressed and redressed on a rapid and sustained basis. The implications of this for fiscal policy (on both revenue and expenditure sides) including levels and allocation should be evident.

DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT GROWTH?

Nominally, absolute poverty reduction, especially personal and communal and perhaps, regional, could be pursued within a constant per capita GDP. Even that means a 3 percent absolute trend growth rate, well above SSA's average since 1980. However, the social and political constraints on such a redistributive process out of fixed resources are usually (perhaps always, except in the context of total revolution or the immediate aftermath of decolonization or civil war) such as to prevent its being far reaching or lasting. Radically altered allocations of additional resources (relative to the existing pattern) are less difficult to attain, and especially, to sustain. For lower and lower-middle income economies, the room to maneuver from redistributing what exists is very narrow to negative, especially where (as in Tanzania) substantial anti-poverty and egalitarian redistribution has previously been carried out under more buoyant economic circumstances

POVERTY AND PLURALISM

Poverty usually creates barriers to pluralism's vitality and breadth. For example, poor, uneducated rural women usually have quite good perceptions of their own needs and goals and of what would be required to satisfy and make progress toward them. Crushing time burdens, gaps in knowledge and skills, negligible resource availability above survival requirements, and limited information on how to acquire what is missing (or how to organize groups to perform certain functions) often prevent their effective organization or participation.

A second strand is a narrowing of who is able to participate fully and who can afford to be a leader. Both require knowledge and time. Those with a resource margin above absolute poverty are more likely to have both. As a result, they can be more effective leaders and their choice by poor members need not be either manipulated or subservient. Equally, they may desire and try to be accountable. Nonetheless, the breadth of pluralism is narrowed and accountability rendered voluntary and optional, which is inherently dangerous.

At a somewhat different level, economic decline increases tension. States and major organizations find themselves less able to serve their members, less able to buy support (or buy off opposition), and less credible. At the same time they face rising levels of complaints (at least as long as their good intentions and ability to act on them retain some credibility), of demands requiring resources to meet, and of challenges to their authority and/or legitimacy. The response may include seeking greater mobilization and participation (to offset losses in other resources) and greater accountability (to demonstrate that the palpable nonsuccesses do not relate to lack of good faith or competence). They are almost certain to include limitations on expression, and more particularly on organization, of dissent and caution in respect of autonomous organizations, especially if they seek to express dissent. Repression, at least episodically, is likely. Certainly these strands of constraint on an always limited, licensed, and scrutinized pluralism in Kenya have grown more severe as poverty has worsened.

There are countervailing factors. Survival is a great mother of invention. There are probably more autonomous rural organizations of poor people at the local level now than in 1980 in most SSA countries. The erosion of state capacity does create operational space. Some existing organizations have been strengthened. This can be ambiguous, for example, the long established Accra market women's organizational structures have become tighter in terms of self-protection against economic adversity and a state that is at best skeptical of their role. But these are oligopsonistic structures that are increasingly (and, on occasion, violently) exclusionist, so the net impact on poor consumers, producers, and would-be marketers is negative.

Other positive developments including broadening of roles for example, of churches into direct social action and organization, and transformation of traditional structures. For example, in Accra, although extended family systems weakened with too many members needing solidarity and too few having resources to provide it, new neighborhood, food seller/processor-linked, and savings/credit social groups emerged to fill some of the resultant gaps. These trends are evidence of the viability and serviceability of pluralism in contexts of increasing economic and social stress. But they should be neither romanticized nor exaggerated. On balance the trend has been negative. Survival is a necessary priority; by itself it is not an adequate one.

PLURALISM AND THE ROAD AHEAD

Looking at pluralism and rehabilitation, recovery, and economic transformation a relatively strong case can be made for its functionality in a "right to development"/ "human condition" strategy albeit (somewhat ironically) not in a neoliberal ("free markets make free men") one. As the British

experience since 1979 strongly suggests neoliberalism is inherently corrosive of pluralism, participation and accountability.

If production by poor people matters, the actual reach of the state is limited even in fields in which it should be present and decentralization is likely to be productively and distributionally efficient, then participation, accountability, and parallel (hopefully complementary) institutional actors are important. That is a substantially more than marginal case for pluralism.

EMERGING FOCI AND DIVERGENCES

The basic convergence is between basic human needs (the right to development) as an over-riding target with universal access to basic services supporting more production by/fairer payment to the poor as the main ways to achieve them and the human investment for productivity approach (originally neoclassical and associated with a fraction of neoliberalism).

This approach has been designed to refute the claims that although poverty and misery (up to and including premature death) may be deplorable "there is no alternative." In the process it has created a politically salable message (vide the response to Band Aid) and, potentially, a way to convert immediate emotional human concern into longer-term backing for rehabilitation, recovery and redevelopment after survival.

There is not complete synthesis of the approaches nor tactical coherence. Production by the poor has encountered much more resistance (intellectually and by, e.g., the World Bank) than universal access to basic services apparently because the latter can be formulated more generally, elegantly, and econometrically and is consistent with strands of traditional neoclassical economics. "Human investment", as a result of its origins and of the fact that middle and higher level personpower, who (at least once trained/educated) are not/will not be poor, is not always clearly related to the short-run human condition of poor majorities.

The initial tactical concentration was on the situation of people made poorer or more vulnerable by stabilization and adjustment programs. This did have the advantage of putting the Bank, and to a lesser extent the Fund and some bilateral agencies on the defensive. Rising malnutrition and, a fortiori, infant mortality linked to ones own programmatic advice is difficult to defend. At that level, at least verbally (and to a lesser degree programmatically), the battle is being won. Virtually all relevant bodies say that the human condition effects of stabilization and structural adjustment measures must be seen as important, and if otherwise sound policies cause deterioration, measures to offset them must be undertaken. The Bank did collaborate in raising \$70-80 million for the initial phase of Ghana's PAMSCAD marketed as such a program.

Three limitations confront any approach focused primarily on the "victims of stabilization and adjustment" (or even the poor among them, bankrupted formerly rich parallel marketeers, more pungently describable as "two-legged wingless vultures," presumably worry few other than themselves and their close associates but former middle-income clerks and managers are prominent beneficiaries of some adjustment amelioration programs including PAMSCAD). First, it is hard to link most human condition deterioration to stabilization/adjustment programs separated from the crises which led to these programs. The counterfactual progression in the absence of the programs is often a downward path. The exceptions relate largely to certain types and levels of fees and to general budgetary deterioration impact on social services more generally; Second, no program designed solely to offset costs of adjustment can be expected to address the basic requirements of all poor and/or vulnerable people. Third, if the human condition is the key test, then how it changes for all people (especially all poor and vulnerable people), whatever the reasons for their initial poor condition, is the central justification or damnation of any applied economic strategy. Means to passing that test are necessarily integral to strategic design, not add ons.

THE HUMAN DIMENSION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Any approach to development (or any other branch of applied political economy) inevitably has a positive or negative human rights component. Any approach centering on the human dimension has an inherent commitment to human rights. Whether to all human rights, with what priorities and to what extent is a more complex (and ultimately contextual) question.

The standard divisions between individual and communal, socioeconomic and civil, hortatory and enforceable, resource expensive and no resource cost, and unifying or divisive human rights are distinctly unhelpful. These supposed distinctions are objectively misleading and serve the subjective purpose of selective opposition to human rights and to regimes opposed on different grounds, not of supporting human rights holistically defined. Virtually all human rights are both individual and communal, for the moderately self-evident reason that human beings live in societies and interact with each other. Freedom of speech is usually categorized as individual. It has meaning, however, only in a community context (of auditors and interactors). Food security is usually classified as communal, but eating enough to avoid hunger or starvation is also a very individual need.

Similarly, socioeconomic and civil rights interpenetrate. Poverty and lack of education have a negative impact on ability to exercise civil liberties. Prevention of freedom of speech, of organization, and of political participation frequently cripple socioeconomic program design, mobilizing power, implementation, and

error correction feedback. The categories are not meaningless, but the assumption of inherent contradiction rather than of basic (even if not total) complementarity is wrong.

Whether rights are hortatory or enforceable is a contextual question with political economic (resource availability and allocation) and sociopolitical (political and legal norms and institutions/processes) aspects. Freedom from hunger/food security is in principle enforceable and in practice hortatory. The resource problem is one of priority in allocation plus practicable delivery (Subsidy or gift? Access to earned income? Capacity to grow more?) problematic. The sociopolitical may either be of norms (How repugnant is the hunger of others? How strong the commitment to a right to eat for each and all?) or of institutions and laws (i.e., of effective accountability). The same is true of effective freedom of speech, that is, the resources and mechanisms for most individuals actually speaking so that their desired audiences can hear and respond to them either do not exist or are otherwise allocated. Norms against, and structures to prevent, communications oligopolization or monopolization are weak in all countries even if the nature of quasi-accepted oligopolists varies.

The resource cost distinction is a variation on the preceding one. Again it does not hold up. Freedom from torture is regularly cited as no cost. But properly equipped, trained and remunerated police, judicial, and prison systems are expensive. So is unresolved and unsanctioned crime. Torture (no matter how morally unacceptable or, for that matter, how ultimately dysfunctional) can be seen as a low resource cost shortcut to which poor victims of crime often have no objection if they perceive it as directed against clever criminals who terrorize witnesses and buy up lawyers and the legal processes. In reverse, if freedom from hunger in a given context requires low-cost means to enable poor farmers to produce, eat, and sell more food and urban workers to earn more and buy more food, the macroeconomic results can be very resource positive (i.e. more resources generated than used) even in the quite short run.

In principle, all human rights are ultimately complementary. In practice, all are both unifying and dividing. Most entail losses for at least some present holders of power, prestige, and/or wealth. Others lead to tensions of right versus right, for example, small indigenous minorities' land and culture rights can conflict with the need to earn a livelihood of poor indigenous majorities. Ecological protection of the "wildlife heritage of humankind" which leads to opposing tsetse fly control even when the latter is vital to preserving the livelihood of poor cattle raisers and to preventing the reemergence of human sleeping sickness also raises conflict of rights issues. More generally, moving toward fuller empowerment to exercise rights costs real resources. Because these are scarce, genuine issues of prioritization, timing, and initial beneficiaries arise. If inability to import say drugs and paper cripples basic health and education services, while average calorie availability is satisfactory, promoting production for export is not irrelevant to enhancing effective human rights.

The human dimension approach has not systematically addressed human rights questions under that rubric, but it has made specific propositions that demonstrably go beyond the caricaturization of "bread and circuses" sometimes applied by critics of poverty-reduction oriented strategies. These include the identification of actual groups of actual poor people on regional, occupational, and gender bases as well as in terms of specific unmet needs (varying from group to group and place to place) and has been characterized by repeated insistence on participation linked to self-organization and expression by poor people.

The quotations from the Khartoum Declaration show certain problems. Increased participation is sometimes viewed as "given" (a noblesse oblige rather than a rights approach), and participation and organization are argued on productivity (avoiding errors, increasing mobilization) rather than normative grounds. Accountability is backed without using the word. But the contrast to the "modernization" conceptualization and declamation is marked, and that with the "neoliberal" still greater. Participation by women and identifiable poor people communally and individually are at the center of the agenda and perceived as having the right to speak for themselves and to be listened to.

The human dimension approach has evolved quite independently of formal human rights dialogue. Even the relevant African Charter and still less the U.N. Declarations or Conventions are virtually never cited; the International Labor Organization (ILO) Conventions are, but rarely. This is not a desirable situation but it is factual. Economic-political-social condition and process-oriented contributors to the human dimension approach should pay more attention to the human rights stream. Human rights workers need to build concrete interaction with real people in real contexts and how they could be empowered to broaden and deepen their rights and especially the components of the right to development. Among African states there is a correlation between operability of key elements of the human dimension approach and respect for human rights so entitled, but the concerns seem to be parallel and the interactions implicit and subliminal rather than articulated and expressed.

This is not because human rights is a Western concept in substance, as opposed to particular verbal and contextual formulations. That argument does not really respect cultural pluralism. It is either racist or a defense of valuable wrongs flowing from the denial of human rights. African societies and traditions do have clear commitments to the duties of rulers and the rights (including participation and self-organization) of subjects. What are perhaps Western are (1) separation of rights and duties (which is inherently incompatible with any social compact formulation) and (2) the isolation of the individual from human (social) contexts, leading to a binary individual/state nexus (curiously inconsistent with actual human contexts, and not least with pluralism). The African Charter encompasses both rights and duties and also the rights of peoples as well as of persons.

AN AFRICAN OVERVIEW

The human condition, the social fabric of people's lives, the state of their cooking pots, is the ultimate test of development. It is also among the vital means to achieving it. To waste much of Africa's basic economic factor of production, the work of its women and men, by allowing them to remain locked in vulnerability, enforced overwork, or enforced idleness and poverty is both a human and social failure and gross economic inefficiency. The reality of what is happening today is starkly summed up in a 1985 UNICEF poster of a young African girl: "What do you want to be when you grow up?" "Alive." For millions of infants and young children over the past decade, it is a plea that has gone unanswered. They are prematurely dead. Unless the right to live can be made real no other human rights are possible. For the dead there is neither a future nor future access to other rights. The average human condition of Africans, women and men, the young and the aged, peasants and urban slum dwellers, the ill and the crippled, displaced victims of drought and of war, is appalling. Worse, it is not improving as it was in most countries, however slowly, prior to 1980. The rips in the social fabrics are lengthening, the cracks in the pots are widening.

These facts are statistically known from a wide range of indicators: infant mortality and life expectancy, malnutrition and food supplies, access to pure water and to sanitation, illiteracy and access to education, income per household and environmental degradation. They are sharply illustrated by the tables and figures at the end of this chapter. The stark reality is that the fabrics of many African societies; national, regional and local, have been wrent. The cooking pots of millions have been broken. To pretend otherwise is to deceive ourselves and to betray the poor and vulnerable people; the women, the children, the displaced victims of drought and war, the poor peasants and the equally poor urban slum dwellers.

PEOPLE AS ACTORS AND SCRIPTWRITERS

No nation can be great and prosperous when the majority of its people are poor and miserable. Those words of Adam Smith set out a central truth. Many of his disciples preaching sermons in Africa and at Africans would do well to use it as a test of their own proposals.

The human condition of individual people, of families, of communities and of societies is, as Mwalimu Julius Nyerere has put it, "the only ultimate objective, justification and validation of development. Human beings are ends not objects, actors not things to be manipulated." Of course increased command over material resources; gross domestic product to use macroeconomic terminology, matters for a nation as well as a household. Food and health,

education and water, sanitation and environmental protection all require real resources. Of course balancing income and expenditure (closing external and fiscal imbalances), matter nationally as well as individually. Crushing debt and demeaning begging damage the human condition of persons, of peoples, and of societies as well as of families and individuals. The need to provide for tomorrow and the duty to the rising and future generations are central to African thought and society. But these things matter because of what they mean for human beings, especially for poor and vulnerable human beings.

People are also in a basic sense means, means to achieving improvements in their human condition through economic recovery and development. Labor and land are two of the three basic factors of economic production. From work applied to natural resources, the third, capital can be won and embodied in productive assets: tree crops and transport systems, improved fields and power plants or dams, hospitals or health posts and factories, houses and shops, schools and mines. But the poverty, the malnutrition, the inadequate access to education of a majority of the people of Africa increasingly weaken their ability to work long, hard, and productively. Their poverty increasingly forces them to abuse and destroy the land so the bone white of ruined, dead, and dying land creeps wider across earth satellite pictures like the destroying cancer it is. By rending the fabric of society, growing immiserization is equally surely breaking the cycles of production, of reproduction, and of surplus generation and is creating contexts in which all human rights, however defined, are always in danger of erosion or extinction.

To regard nutrition, health services, and education as the fruits of development to be deferred until after high production has been attained is self-defeating. Only the well nourished, healthy and literate can consistently and increasingly be efficient productive workers. To see access to pure water, reduction of women's workload, and child survival as goals for after economic recovery is to ensure that there will be, at best, delayed and stunted recovery. Women worn out carrying water for miles, tending sick children, and bearing replacements for those prematurely dead are not merely denied their rights as human beings but drained of the time and energy to produce more.

Similarly, to restore and to expand output requires the fuller participation in production of the poor, not their exclusion from it. To provide tractors and large irrigated farms for the few and to ignore machetes and jembes (cutlasses and hoes) and improved seeds for the many is economic madness. It can not solve malnutrition (the poor will have no means to buy food) nor, usually, restore a viable trend rate of growth of agricultural output. To make this case against large public sector agricultural units and ignore its applicability to the private sector is to become trapped in ideological tunnel vision.

Production matters. It requires exports as well as textbooks, lorries as well as basic drugs; efficient factories as well as (indeed to produce) jembes and machetes; taxes as well as protected wells. For some crops, in some places.

under some conditions, large units and mechanization do make social and economic sense. The point is not to argue for basic services instead of production or production by the poor instead of by the not so poor. It is to stress that most present plans do the reverse. They fail to recognize the vital role of basic services and of production by the poor, without which recovery will be limited and development (even in narrowly economic terms) virtually unattainable.

STABILIZATION, ADJUSTMENT: AND OR INSTEAD OF RESTORING THE HUMAN CONDITION?

Economic malaise, crises, and decline have weighed most heavily on poor and vulnerable people. When government resources are reduced, provision of basic services and maintenance of infrastructure are cut back, usually from the periphery. Feeder roads go first, capital city highways last. When health services face resource crises, rural health posts and clinics are usually hit first and central reference hospitals last. It is to the credit of some African states' medical services and communities (and their external cooperating partners) that there are exceptions to that pattern, but, in general, the greater the distance, geographic, gender, indigenous ethnic, social, economic or political, from the centers of power, the greater the cutbacks.

When production falters, vulnerable people lose their employment, see the product of their self-employment fall, and have their entitlement to food torn away. They do not have the resources to ride out a crisis nor the flexibility to adjust to new ways of earning a decent livelihood. Most have indeed adapted enough to survive, without that they would have died. But millions could not adapt; they have died. For the poor and vulnerable people of Africa, death is very close, margins above survival very narrow. As the proverb puts it, give a rich man less food and he will grow thin; give a poor man less food and he will die.

Crises of falling export earnings and import capacity, eroding government revenues, and inflationary deficits, inefficient policies, and under-utilized capacity are very real. But they are not more real nor more important than crises of rising numbers living in absolute poverty with rising infant mortality, of the re-emergence of killer diseases like yaws and yellow fever, of school systems near collapse and peasants without tools or seeds. They are part of the same human crisis. The first crises exacerbate the latter; reducing the latter is necessary to addressing the first.

Therefore, one basic test of all economic recovery and development programs is whether they will improve the human condition make poor people less poor and vulnerable people less vulnerable by making it possible for them to produce more and by increasing their access to basic services as well as their control over program and policy formulation and their ability to hold decision

takers and professionals accountable. If a program cannot pass those tests in prospect, and also in operation, it is fatally flawed and itself in need of structural adjustment or total redesign. This test is stronger than whether the stabilization and adjustment programs are the basic cause of poverty (they are not) or of whether they address the problems of poor and vulnerable people directly injured by some of their components (important but inadequate). Human condition recovery must go step by step with production recovery or neither is likely to be either efficient or sustainable.

Because the plight of the poor and vulnerable is the most desperate and urgent it is useful to indicate more specifically who these people are. Most fall into seven groups:

1. victims of prolonged drought and/or ecological degradation whose previous sources of income have been wiped out;
2. poor, often female-headed households pushed by land shortages onto marginal or sub-marginal land-pioneers and victims of the "rural sponge" effect which has limited the rise of open unemployment/landlessness;
3. households in isolated or peripheral areas physically and institutionally at the end of the line for all goods and services;
4. small producers, usually primarily engaged in selfprovisioning but also selling food even when they have a nutritional deficit, because it is their basic cash income source, unable to increase or even sustain output with declining access to inputs;
5. victims of war who are dislocated with loss of access to health, education, and water as well as of land, herds, homes, tools, seeds, and food stocks and plunged into a context of physical insecurity and psychological trauma while government resources and physical capabilities are debilitated by war bills and destruction;
6. "informal" urban sector members whose numbers have risen while incomes of the formal sector they served and supplemented fell and whose slum or exurb areas have become more crowded and less provided with basic services; and
7. urban wage earners whose real wages have plunged so sharply they and other household members have had to add "informal" economic activities to limit the fall in their living standards to survive.

THE SLIPPERY SLOPE REVISITED

How the economies of most African states and the human condition of most African people came to be so debilitated matters; not primarily to win debates or apportion blame, but to understand how to win clear and "to look our mistakes squarely in the face lest we fall into repeating them," as Rector Rui Balthasar Santos of Eduardo Mondlane University put it.

The radical, general worsening of the situation dates to 1980. After very low growth over 1970-1975, most African states made fairly rapid economic

progress over 1976–1979 and human condition indicators advanced, even if limited and unequally distributed. Since then, all but a handful of Africa's economies have been on a declining path in terms of per capita output, while poverty and vulnerability have been growing. Why?

One major answer (it probably dominates output per capita declines), is the 1979–1988 evolution of the international economic environment confronting Africa. The 1979–1982 recession and slow 1983–1988 recovery in the industrial economies have had a disastrous impact on Africa's exports, valued in terms of import capacity. A World Bank study showed that between 1976 and 1981, several African economies, for example, the Côte d'Ivoire and Tanzania, as among the worst affected. Many primary products' real values (import purchasing power per unit exported) are at fifty year lows and the recent slight recovery in metals and virtually all projections give little promise of significant change. Industrial economy protectionism and dumping have hampered export diversification. The financial flow position has also worsened. Real net concessional finance per capita (grants and new soft loans less interest and repayment on old) declined sharply from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s and have been stagnant since. Nonconcessional flows have gone negative. Africa has a debt burden relative to exports greater than that of any other region. Payment on present terms is not possible and the attempt to sustain it is dramatically limiting imports, choking off recovery and worsening the human condition. That is not just the view of African governments, the African Development Bank (ADB), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and the Organization for African Unity (OAU), but also of analyses by the World Bank, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, the British chancellor of the exchequer and a banker-majority UN expert group.

Drought on a virtually continental scale exacerbated the already unsatisfactory food production trend. After good years in 1985–1986, 1987–1988 again saw several droughts. Until food production levels in normal years (especially by poor peasants) are much higher, vulnerability of output to drought is reduced and holding of reserves (especially at peasant household level) augmented, this scourge will regularly derail or reverse recovery efforts.

For many African economies, the macroeconomic and human costs of war are greater than those of any other exogenous shock. nowhere is this as brutally clear as in Southern Africa. Mozambique and Angola production (excluding oil) is about half what it would be had South Africa not waged war against them, directly and by proxy. As detailed in UNICEF's *Children on the Front Line*, by the end of 1988 over 1,000,000 human beings were already dead as direct or indirect results of the war, up to 12 million driven from their homes, and up to 8 million in danger of starvation. Other wars equally destructive of the human condition, including life itself, are less exogenous. The wars of the Horn of Africa, of the Sudan, and of Uganda have roots that are indigenous and centuries old. Even in these cases external action and inaction has raised the potential for

destruction and made resolution of conflicts more difficult. The external actions include those of other African states as well as of great powers for example, Libya in Uganda, the mutual destabilization of the Horn states and a fortiori Morocco's colonial conquest of the Sahara Democratic Republic.

Not all causes are exogenous. African governments have made policy mistakes and have been too slow in responding to the worsening external context. In all candor, however, it should be noted that many of these decisions were taken on external advice and are now attacked by those who once pushed them. With the adoption of APPER and of national rehabilitation, recovery and renewed development programs by a majority of African states, there has been substantial improvement on the economic policy front. That again is not solely the judgment of the OAU or the UNECA; the World Bank and the United Nations General Assembly have said the same.

To date, these economic policies rarely give adequate attention to the human dimension nor enough priority to improving it. That is no new weakness, it typified most development plans and programs of the 1960s and 1970s. Then, however, with less constrained resources and a less hostile international economic environment, the old export-led, dependent, central city and high-income group-focused model was consistent with some improvement in human condition indicators in general and in basic services extension in particular. Today and tomorrow no such compatibility is likely to be within the grasp of most Africa states. Either the nature and priorities of development will be rethought and acted on new premises, or what economic growth there is will march hand in hand with rising levels of inequality and poverty, misery, and instability.

One concrete example is health. Life expectancy is much lower and mortality much higher in Africa than in the industrial North. The largest single difference is in infant and under five year mortality. These are 30 percent of all deaths in Sub-Saharan Africa but only 2 to 3 percent in most industrial economies. The main causes are neonatal tetanus, five epidemic diseases (including measles, tuberculosis and polio), malaria, impure-water-related morbidity (including diarrhea), and malnutrition linked diseases and/or loss of resistance to disease. For older children and adults malnutrition and impure water related diseases, malaria, a handful of epidemic diseases and accidents, treatable by first aid, are the dominant killers.

Urban hospital care is largely irrelevant to reducing these death tolls in Africa, as it was in Europe. Yet it engrosses 60 to 70 percent of the typical African health budget. Primary health care (including first aid), basic drug lists and supplies, extended immunization programs, oral rehydration and simple health education (including sanitation) are of proven low-cost effectiveness. But they receive 10 to 15 percent of the majority of African health budgets. The warning of Cheik Hamidou Kane is even more timely now than when he first

made it in 1965, "Frustrations and failure will mount if we do not immediately summon the courage to revise the ways we think and take action "

WHAT IS TO BE DONE? ROADS BACK AND FORWARD

To make the human condition integral and central to Africa's economic recovery and development requires a comprehensive political and socioeconomic strategy encompassing at least eight elements:

1. recognition that people matter as subjects and ends of and main means and actors to attaining stabilization, recovery and renewed development;
2. understanding that throwing away much of Africa's most basic factor of production, the labor of its people, by excluding the poor and vulnerable, is economically wasteful and inefficient;
3. acting on the reality that marginal rates of economic, as well as social return from enabling poor people to produce more, are often high (a real problem is making small, contextual, poor-people-centered projects visible to central decision takers and credible to bureaucrats and analysts and making regulations compatible with implementing them);
4. comprehension that health, education, and pure water are both human and social goods and important to maintaining present and raising future economic productivity, to making possible fuller participation in production by women, who are the chief victims of illiteracy and on whose backs falls the burden of fetching water and caring for the sick;
5. focusing on employment and production, not subsidies and relief; e.g. through employment programs to relieve drought losses and rehabilitate the economic base of poor households;
6. articulation of short-term priorities to lay foundations for long-run sustained development; for example, in applied, field tested, peasant user friendly, producer cost effective agricultural research begun now to make it possible to sustain 5 percent agricultural growth in the late 1990s;
7. political as well as economic awareness that participation in production by poor people is crucial to underpinning their survival and the improvement of their human condition (without it their social and political participation will remain limited and perpetually at risk);
8. comprehension of the extreme economic inefficiency of rending the fabric of society: strikes and riots, go-slows and loss of morale, steadily growing grinding poverty and recurrent economic disasters without human rehabilitation are devastating even in narrow economic terms.

The poor and the vulnerable are not amorphous masses; but groups of human beings. To fail to see what their needs are, as perceived by themselves, is to

exclude them. To suppose their needs and capabilities are uniform is to render many people invisible. These errors and blindnesses are particularly frequent and serious with respect to women. Most African women are excluded or invisible but also overburdened and under-assisted. Basic barriers to economic as well as human development posed by the excessive work load most African women bear are rarely recognized clearly. The implications of the gender division of labor in agriculture are rarely taken account of by agricultural research and extension. These elements are central to serious efforts to improve the human condition. Three elements are crucial:

1. universal access to literacy, to basic education, to primary health care, to pure water, to agricultural inputs, to fuel, is disproportionately beneficial to women because when access is limited, they are disproportionately deprived of them;
2. serious attention to reducing women's workload, for example, by closer water and health facilities, by programs (e.g., immunization) reducing child illness, by improving technologies relevant to female tasks (e.g., food processing, moving water and fuelwood, as well as food production);
3. central roles for women in planning/decision-making about projects and programs that primarily affect them, for example, rural water supply and maintenance, sanitation, food crop research and extension.

The preceding conceptualization is not, especially in this full-blooded and consistently articulated a form, dominant in Africa today. But neither is it absent or simply the importation of an external intellectual fad. In fragmentary forms, diverse formulations and different degrees of comprehensiveness and forcefulness it is both widespread and gaining ground from farmsteads to capitals, from the excluded to the intellectuals, from the marginalized to the powerful, and in commitment and praxis as well as principle and prose. The Khartoum Declaration of March 1988 on the Human Dimension does embody priorities and perceptions that were not equally prominent even three years earlier. However wide the gap between affirmation and action the movement is on both fronts not just affirmation.

ACCOUNTABILITY—RECONSTRUCTION—PLURALISM

Accountability is used here in the sense of being able to select, sanction, and remove leaders or major institutional actors. For accountability to be reliable and efficient requires both adequate data from the leaders on their actions in a form allowing independent evaluation/judgment and also a capacity for such evaluation/judgment by the recipients.

The case for accountability is not that all choices/decisions will be normatively just or even functionally desirable for those holding the leaders to

account. Democracy neither needs to be nor can be defended on the basis that under it all decisions are just and/or functional with respect to the goals that led to their being taken. The case is that without accountability, democracy is at best voluntarily given by leaders, as is participation, and decisions are likely to be even less efficient from human condition/human rights perspectives. The relevance of pluralism is that independent/autonomous organizations provide channels through which to route, and bases from which to press for, accountability. Which organizations depends on contexts.

SOME PRACTICAL ISSUES IN ACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability is fragmented, uneven, incomplete, and feeble in SSA. Formal structural examination does not help understand many cases because the actual processes and accountabilities vary widely; for example, the single-party states in Tanzania and Kenya afford very different degrees of power to enforce accountability to peasants absolutely and relative to other groups. Similarly, ombudspersons, where effective at all, usually tend to provide access not primarily to the poor who would otherwise have none but improved access for diligent middle-class members.

Severe processual problems arise among levels. For example, a society in which a political structure is relatively open and accountable from the base up and is explicitly superior to the governmental structures officially, should, on the face of it, guarantee accountability. But if each party level can call each government level to account, incoherence and wide divergences in praxis are likely, whereas otherwise the base up then across and top down way of holding accountable is cumbersome and slow.

Contextual differences with direct local accountability are hard to reconcile with national coherence and it is not safe to assume either that the latter is revivial or that the closer to the base political or governmental institutions/personnel are the greater their concern with the human condition or felling of responsibility to poor people. Acceptance of accountability and perception of responsibility does not lead automatically to meaningful acceptance of base-level participation in operational policy articulation, formulation, and decision making, still less to a guarantee that policies will in fact, serve their intended beneficiaries well, cost efficiently, or even at all.

External agencies have genuine problems with respect to client accountability. They already have accountability structures to governing councils and/or parent ministries. These are usually along standard intergovernmental organization or national institutional lines. They do not (even when the council does include South governments) result in real accountability to any particular client on any specific issue, even at national level. At best there is an openness to listen to client critiques and to try (on, at

best, a voluntary normative responsibility basis) to respond to them. More rarely there is also involvement of clients in program design and results monitoring.

It is easier to criticize this pattern than to suggest alternatives. Multiple lines of accountability will lead to conflicts and conflicting demands. How these can be minimized, guidelines for weighting different obligations devised, and a workable conflict resolution procedure created is by no means self-evident, especially across an array of widely divergent host settings. Yet for some agencies in some host contexts to make the attempt is essential if operational progress is to be made.

PROMOTION, EMPOWERING, ENJOINING, SANCTIONING

Achieving progress toward greater and broader effective access to human rights and a fuller and less precarious human dimension to rehabilitation and development require complex processes. The failure to realize and to articulate that realization is partly the result of the parallelism rather than interaction of the human dimension and human rights approaches. Advocates of the former stress rational explication and normative campaigning to promote change and resource allocations to empower it. They are less prone to consider structures to forestall, and procedures to enjoin, deviations from stated goals and still less prone to consider how offenders (or at the least offenses) could be sanctioned and grievances redressed. Human rights lawyers tend to stress sanctioning and enjoining (by court cases or public pressure) plus a different style of normative promotion with little attention to institutional means to prevent or limit harm and even less to resource provision to empower states and societies, as well as persons, smaller communities, and enterprises, to achieve, to provide, and to exercise human rights. Logically, the two approaches are complementary but with little interaction to date, this is not obvious and they are often misconstrued as alternative or antagonistic.

Promotion (or consciousness and coalition building) is a first step toward realizing change. People, including groups with substantial cumulative actual or potential power, need to be convinced that: the change is desirable; as well as practicable, and will serve their needs and/or interests. Without that base, the only way to achieve change is top down imposition (or small-scale quasi-anarchic parallel system construction).

Empowerment involves, first, identifying what specific resources (by no means only financial or material resources) are needed to achieve what goals, by (and for) whom, over what time span and, second, devising ways to mobilize additional or reallocate existing resources to those ends. This is no trivial matter, Damascus Road conversions are not always necessary (some governments and leaders, as well as many poor people, do believe in human rights and give priority to the human dimension) and are rarely sufficient. II

does no good to seek to sanction a very poor country for not instantly providing universal literacy, universal access to primary health care, and universal adequate dietary entitlements. Persons and small communities (or enterprises) need political space to organize and to act, access to knowledge, trained personnel, and genuinely supportive expert assistance in specialized areas, as well as material and financial resources. Societies and states need the same. The political space may be international (it is dangerous to be a radical democratic state socialist near the United States) or national (entrenched indigenous elite minorities and less inherently elitist bodies, such as some trade and student unions, can destabilize radical reformist governments: vide the road to the assassination of Thomas Sankara).

Promotion and empowerment are not enough. Genuine mistakes and hostile intentions (including vested interests in lethargy and an easy life as well as in enjoyment of exploitative profit or non-accountable power) exist. It is crucial to avert, prevent, and enjoin actions or inactions which hamper, halt, or reverse progress toward fuller attainment of human rights.

Prevention, not redress after damage, and structures leading to appropriate initial actions not procedures for enjoying wrong ones are the basic institutional and processual goals. Institutional structures that build in participation and accountability (as well as ones that ignore or prevent them) can be devised and operated. Resource allocation criteria in favor of the human dimension approach can be articulated and prospective policies, ongoing processes, and retrospective evaluation of results monitored in that light. Institutions can facilitate and create a normal pattern of acceptable conduct. They can limit the number and degree of but cannot avert deviations. The processual goal is to identify and enjoin (socially, politically, and legally) promptly and effectively by grievance raising, conciliation and injunctive relief procedures with power to provide prompt, equitable and effective resolutions of real or potential conflict accessible to poor people and their organizations as well as to weak minority peoples and communities.

There will be violations of human rights and debasement of the human condition. Need, honest error, and greed combine to ensure that. To create incentives to avert their multiplying and to make public the challenges and threats to human rights/human dimension there must be laws, legal processes, and accessible procedures to sanction these offenses. Compensation for damage done is sometimes an equally important component of effective redress as is the imposition of criminal, as well as civil, penalties on gross offenders.

There is a need to pay attention to causation. Need-based offenses do not, with very rare exceptions, justify criminal sanctions. Hanging every peasant who cuts down trees or bushes for fuel or house poles in areas that are ecologically at risk is neither an equitable nor a conceivably effective way of halting erosion, desertification (strictly speaking neo-desertification), or deforestation. (Indeed the wood requirement for the gallows would be so great

as to have the reverse effect.) Empowerment (in this case by silviculture education plus relevant seedlings, by state or community reforestation and erosion control, by alternative fuel provision and/or by selective, voluntary, assisted resettlement) is a precondition for halting need based erosion of the human condition. When empowerment is in process, civil regulations are needed as is their enforcement; fining those who chop down genuinely community planted and tended trees is hardly unreasonable and may be essential. Honest error should not be confused with greed or malice. Honest error after careful study and evaluation of options in a participatory, accountable context should rarely be sanctioned at all. To do so is to create an incentive never to decide but always to postpone or refer. What needs to be sanctioned is negligence.

Severe sanctions should apply to violations related to greed, for power, for non-accountability, or for material gain. The first goal is to stop the offense and the broader to avert (or at least reduce) its repetition. If major damage has been done, securing redress (from the offender if possible, otherwise from more or less innocent parties, in practice likely to be taxpayers or users of other public services if the state reimburses, more able to bear the cost than the initial victims) is important but limiting future damages to future victims is always central. Exposure to public opinion of a high-profile sanctioning process is costly and the real risk of sanctions is perceived as good economic reason to allocate resources to avoid being sanctionable, the process matters by itself in addition to the impact of its outcome. Union Carbide has been shaken (almost to pieces) by the Bhopal case, and other chemical companies appear to have decided that, at least to some extent, prevention and safety pay.

Sanctioning institutions and structures matter. The law's delay is proverbial. Thought (and action on it) as to what civil and criminal remedies are needed for human rights violations/human condition debasement is needed. The issues are complex — criminal law processes often do not cover redress to victims; in civil cases procedures other than standard gladiatorial court contests may offer effective redress faster. But access is crucial no matter how appropriate the institutions and procedures. Access to specialist personnel and to financing the costs of the process. Poor people do not and, in any practicable and equitable legal system, cannot, argue, finance, and win major court cases by themselves. They need specialists to support them and money to pay them, both of which are often unavailable in Africa.

PLURALISM — POTENTIAL RELEVANCE TO BETTER GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

The role of pluralism is to increase the probability that persons, especially poor persons, will be able to organize themselves to act, to influence the actions

of others, and to hold other major actors to account. At the national provincial and basic community level three clusters of issues or topics appear to be central, civil society and its room to organize and to act, accountability, and access to channels designed to protect empowerment.

Civil society is used here as a shorthand for freedom of self-organization, self-expression, and self-operated action initiatives especially, but not only, at base level. It need not mean pluralism in the North American sense and is no more inconsistent (or at any rate antagonistically contradictory) with decentralized, democratic single mass party systems than with bourgeois democratic structures.

The necessity of room to maneuver for civil society rests on two legs: first, people in base communities or action groups have knowledge of their own needs and potentials no one else does or can have and second, unless poor people and marginalized groups are able to participate—in production, in mobilization, in decision-making and in calling decision-makers (including their own leadership) to account there will be no objective and especially no institutional power base to protect their interests from counter-attacks by other interest groups who are organized.

Room to maneuver requires self-organization and control over organizations. Some aspects require immediacy and operational autonomy. Even with local-level freedom of action within nationally integrated single-channel structures, it is doubtful whether this can be achieved or sustained and reasonably certain it can be achieved more easily and sustained more securely with multiple organizational structures. The cases for specialization and division of labor and for competition are not inherently capitalist. Mikhail Gorbachev seems to agree, albeit his case for quasi-pluralism is purely functional and within a control frame arguably too rigid for the sought quasi-pluralism to have adequate vitality and impact or even much staying power. The evident cases are religious and cultural organizations. Almost equally strong ones can be made out for economic-interest (or sub-class) based organizations, for informational channels, and for gender- and age-based groups. It is simply untrue that all local-level organizations or actions need to be consolidated into provincial and national structures so long as coordination and mechanisms to correct damaging inconsistencies exist.

Accountability faces two very real problems. Multiple channels and organizations do not guarantee internal accountability of any. Lack of accountability in SSA is frequently pervasive, not limited to central political institutions. There appears to be a correlation between political channel non accountability and non-accountability of other organizations. This should not be cause for despair but it is cause for further reflection as to the conditions and contexts appropriate/conducive to achieving and sustaining accountability in various types of organizations, especially ones large and complex enough that direct, face-to-face accountability is impracticable.

Accountability takes time. It need not slow down action so much as to be dysfunctional. But although most members want accountability to be available, so long as leaders and officials deliver what are broadly viewed as acceptable results, only a small minority of members are willing to devote much time to enforcing and operating accountability. Unless an ongoing base level of accountability praxis exists, it is wishful thinking that it can suddenly be turned on when things go wrong.

Rapid institutional shifts often fail to build in accountability and, thereby, defeat their own objectives. The 1984–1986 privatization of much of Tanzanian crop marketing to reorganized primary co-ops grouped under recreated co-op unions is a textbook example. The co-ops were set up accountable to neither peasants nor state but only to a managerial cadre whose uneven standards of efficiency and probity had been only too clearly shown over 1960–1976. As a direct result, marketing costs have risen and the crop marketing deficit has been “privatized” in the form of bank loans to cover losses. Because the Tanzanian state is accountable and responsive to peasants, halting loans to co-ops (and thus purchases of peasant crops) was viewed as inconceivable. But the losses became by 1989 the main engine of inflation and co-ops were increasingly unable to buy crops promptly. The 1990 World Bank imposed ban on bank loans to co-ops (with the rest of the private sector physically incapable of filling the gap) reduced peasant real prices for crops by 50 percent. It almost certainly played a major role in the draconian March Cabinet reshuffle. Because it paralyses trade and exports and threatens the survival of the state, it is likely to be reversed. The point remains, speedy shifts failing to build in accountability in key institutions can have very high costs even in narrow macroeconomic terms.

Protecting empowerment, especially of poor persons and groups (subclasses) that are predominately poor or vulnerable is central to a “human condition”/“right to development” oriented strategy and praxis. The impact of pluralism is unfortunately, distinctly problematic. This is not inherent in pluralism but a probable result of partial pluralism in societies in which resource distribution (including time, knowledge, and influence on/power over central political institutions) is radically unequally distributed. Trade unions are historically most effective at organizing employees with above average skills and wages. Their interests are unlikely to be identical to those of workers with lower skills and wages and a fortiori to those unemployed. In SSA, non-wage predominantly labor incomes, that is, those of peasants, other household producers, and small scale enterprise operators, are central to more households than are middle and large employer wage payments. Their interests are in some areas analogous with those of trade unions, but in others they really are competitive. The answer does not lie in suppressing or coopting trade unions but in building up equally strong organizations in other labor income subsectors. Until that is achieved the view that trade union strength and freedom to

maneuver may not serve the interests of the majority of poor households is by no means necessarily disingenuous.

CONSTITUTIONS, CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS AND PLURALISM

In SSA, the average gap between constitutional orders defined as basic political/civil society goals and operating principles and constitutional documents (constitutions) is exceptionally wide. Constitutions do not comprehend important parts of the constitutional order. Substantial gaps between constitutional (in either order or document sense) goals and practices exist, and formal documents tend to lag behind praxis.

The argument that constitutions are used to mystify and to manipulate by dominant decision-making coalitions (often quite narrow ones), which have very different goals and preferred operating principles, may well miss the bottom line. Many African constitutions are simply irrelevant. They do not, in any meaningful sense, represent the goals or operating principles of any significant interest groups/subclasses, are not seen as relevant to constitutional orders, and exist because it is believed that, like national anthems, coats of arms, and flags, constitutions and "development plans" are something that states have to have for ceremonial and formal symbolic purposes.

The reasons for this situation are by no means obscure. Precolonial Sub-Saharan African polities rarely had written and often did not have formally codified oral constitutions. (The exceptions to the first rule were almost without exception both transitory and cases of precolonial neocolonialism, e.g., the Fanti Confederacy and the Rehoboth Captaincy.) They had constitutional orders and frequently evolving, disintegrating, or structurally changing ones, but formal constitutions of the Western type played negligible roles in them. In many cases, the colonial states also literally did not have constitutions and where in some sense they did these were primarily pieces of administrative and organizational law. It cannot be asserted that the constitutional orders of the metropolitan states were the actual constitutions of the colonial states, very much *au contraire*.

The first round of independence constitutions, with few exceptions, were formed and imposed by the departing colonial state with limited input from the emergent domestic constitutional order. This did less than nothing either for their contextual appropriateness, for commitment to them, or to constitutions more generally as documents of real significance. Exceptions include Ethiopia, but in that case the Imperial Constitutions were luxury consumer goods import rather like the Western liberal/philosophy elements used as Christmas tree ornaments on the Tsarist state by Peter and Katherine the Great. Two other exceptions are Angola and Mozambique where revolutionary movements drafted and enacted them. Although idealistic (in the technical sense of that term)

despite their Marxist-Leninist form, they were seen as more serious documents and might have been so had both states not been engulfed by wars of resistance to external aggression. Arguably, Mozambique has had an evolution of its constitutional order at least in part organically linked to constitution evolution.

Subsequent constitutions have rarely emerged from genuine reflective and participatory processes. This is fairly evident in the case of the products of coups and of elite revolutions but is of broader relevance. The post-military government Ghanaian and Nigerian constitutions were in certain senses the outcome of reflection and of participatory processes. However, they focused so heavily on averting repetition of particular routes to breakdowns that had led to military takeovers as to be only formalistically concerned with many basic goals, nonoperable and remarkably open to new abuses and disintegrative tendencies.

This generalization does have exceptions. The post independence Tanzanian constitutional reshapings (including the party constitutions) do arise out of the evolution of the constitutional order. Whatever their limitations, they are serious, related to reality, and have a participatory and political power base grounding. The post-Lancaster House Zimbabwean constitutional amendments (here perhaps especially the ZANU-ZAPU merger modifications to the surviving ZANU constitution) may well represent the start of a similar process. Namibia's somewhat over determined constitution is a serious exercise in national reconciliation.

CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS AND THEIR IMPERFECTIONS

African states have constitutional orders. In respect to breadth of base (or more accurately narrowness), predictability of decisions, stability of procedures, and scope or reach of the constitutional order, many are objectively weak and/or eroding. Some are disintegrating or excessively hard to define as other than pathological except in terms of a narrow group of beneficiaries, for example, authoritarian kleptocracies in which the purpose of public office (however acquired) is private gain and the chief means of securing political (or military) support is fairly literally buying it. The most frequently cited cases are Zaire, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, but despite its origins and initial democratic patina the actual nature of the last Nigerian civil state tended in that direction, and Amin's Uganda was an example whose short life related to over-use of violence, under-use of coherent tactics and failure to maintain workable relations with external patrons/protectors.

Self-serving decision-making coalition defined and enforced constitutional orders are common in Africa and globally. The degree of narrowness and the particular makeup of the subclass coalitions vary but the basic natures seem similar. Kenya, the Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau and Burkina (today) are examples. Regimes, usually but not always authoritarian, without very clear,

broad, or stable subclass coalition bases are not uncommon, for example, Ghana (1982 to date), Burkina (of Sankara), Uganda today, and in a very different way Malawi (at least until 1986). Fragility and possibility of sharp change (from within the regime as well as by its mutation or demise) may be the only common features of such systems; certainly the substantive constitutional order goals of J. J. Rawlings and Hastings Banda have little in common.

A final category of limited, potentially pathological or pathological constitutional orders (in this case limited, but in danger of more dire futures) are those that have had greater breadth, participation, and scope but are disintegrating under external or domestic tensions at or near the level of organized, large-scale violence and/or disintegration of the resource base actually mobilizable by the state and its most important sub-class supporters. Post-Nimeiri Sudan illustrated and post-1975 Zambia illustrates this pattern.

But healthier, more broadly based, and arguably evolving/developing constitutional orders also exist. Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Botswana are all examples and a case can be made for including somewhat problematic cases such as Senegal and Gambia.

Starting from a human condition/right to development approach the features of assent, participation, access, equity and operationality needed to develop constitutional orders can be fairly readily articulated. However, because the starting points diverge massively (Sierra Leone is not Tanzania, Cape Verde is not Equatorial Guinea, Sudan is not Mozambique, Uganda is not Kenya) as do the present dominant decision-making coalitions, the concrete possibilities for, requirements of, and constraints on short-term mobilization and action vary widely. Except in a handful of cases, constitutional order reconstruction and development is a precondition for constitution reform to be effective. Seeking once again to substitute a legal engineering superstructure for a constitutional order infrastructure is no more likely to be productive now than over 1957–1988. Pluralism can play a role in building up the breadth and strength of the constitutional order. However, to do so many parallel channel and other independent organizations in SSA need to look first at their own constitutional orders. These are often just as weak, disintegrating or pathological as those of states.

ENVOI

Neoliberalism and growthmanship both face rapidly waning credibility and legitimacy in SSA. Right to development/human condition strategic and tactical approaches, the latter exemplified by the Khartoum Declaration, have gained substantial intellectual, policymaker, and operational credibility and support. The roles of participation, self-organization, decentralization and accountability in these approaches interact with participatory pluralism.

Where now is a question subject to intellectual examination, but from the point of view of those, predominantly Africans in SSA, whose well-being and in many cases literal survival depends on reversal of 1980s trends, the challenge is that of the Mara proverb cited by Mwalimu Nyerere:

*Rabbit, where are you going?
I am going to kill the Elephant!
Can you really do it?
Well, I'll try and try again!*

Table 8.1

Selected Quality of Life Indicators: 1960–mid-1980s^a

	1960	1970	Late 1970s	1980s	Low Income Sub-Saharan Africa (1982)
1. Average Life Expectancy at Birth	45	49	55	53	48
2. Infant Mortality Rate	132	107	86	107–120	118
3. Child Death Rate	27	21	15	25–30	24
4. Access to Health Facility ^b	-	-	-	30	45
5. Public Health Facility Visits per Person per Year	-	-	0.7	0.4	2
6. Health Budget as % of GDP	-	1.2	-	0.26	0.95
7. Access to Pure Water					
Rural	-	14	14	48	14
Urban	-	86	86	75	62
Total	-	35	35	60	22
8. Access to Excreta Disposal ^d					
Rural	-	40	40	30	25
Urban	92	95	65	69	
Total	-	55	56	44	32
9. Average Caloric Availability as a % of Requirements	92	97	88	68	91
10. Child Malnutrition (Moderate/Severe)	-	-	36	5–5	40
11. Primary Education Enrolment Ratio ^e	38 (46)	64 (75)	69 (80)	- (80)	69 (-)
12. Adult Literacy	27	30	-	30–35	44
13. Education Budget as % of GDP	-	3.9	-	0.85	2.81
14. Population Below Absolute Poverty Line ^f					
Rural	-	-	60–65	67.5–72.5	65
Urban	-	-	30–35	45–50	35

PRINCIPAL SOURCES

World Bank, Comparative Analysis and Data Division, Economic Analysis and Projections Department (June 1984), *World Development Report 1985*; UNICEF, *Statistics on Children in UNICEF Assisted Countries* (April 1985); UNICEF Ghana: *Situation Analysis of Women and Children* (July 1984)

NOTES

- a) 1960 data refer to a year between 1959 and 1961; 1970 between 1969 and 1971; late 1970s between 1975 and 1980; 1980s to 1982, 1984 or 1985.
- b) Defined in terms of location within a 5 kilometer radius. May overstate for population when facilities available are small.
- c) 1970 and late 1970s urban figures may be overstated by failing to relate number of water points to population.
- d) 1970 and 1978 figures for urban and possibly rural areas overstate by failing to relate number of drop-holes to supposed user population.
- e) Adjusted for length of primary cycle. () are unadjusted figures. Because of the primary/middle school division Ghana has a shorter primary cycle than most SSA countries.
- f) Estimate made by author based on fragmentary data.

Table 8.2

Selected Quality of Life Indicators—Southern Africa and Somalia

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Somalia ^d
Population (millions)	8.5	1.1	1.5	6.9	14.0	0.6	22.0	6.5	8.5	5.5
Under-5 mortality (per 100 births)	325-375 ^a	100	145	280	325-375 ^a	185	185	135	120	174-210
Infant mortality (0-1)(per 1,000 births)	200 ^a	75	110	160	200	125	110	85	75	146-180
Infant and child malnutrition (%)	NA	32	NA	31	NA	NA	(50)	28	NA	16
Average caloric intake relevant to requirements (%)	87	(94)	100	97	79	(108)	101	89	89	(105)
Access to health services	(30)	(89)	NA	80	(30)	NA	(71)	75	71	(20)
Access to safe water	21	(76)	(14)	(41)	(13)	48	(47)	46	(52)	33
Primary enrolment (%) (1982) ^c	66	76 ^b	71	46	46 ^b	84 ^b	87 ^b	94	131	15
Adult (over 15) literacy (%) (1982)	28	61	70	(36)	27	(61)	85 ^b	69	69	16
One-year-olds fully vaccinated (%)										
TB	40	70	91	72	(46)	95 ^b	(84)	87	88	31
DTB	8	82	59	66	(56)	79 ^b	(58)	49	68	22
Polio	55	77	64	68	(32)	60 ^b	(56)	47	63	22
Measles	62	75	63	64	(32)	51 ^b	(82)	56	55	36
Life expectancy at birth	(41)	55	50	46	(45)	54	52	52	56	45-49
GNP per capita	490	960	530	180	(230)	790	210	470	760	(350)

() = 1980 (or nearby year). Somalia re-estimated to include unrecorded remittances ^b 1983

^aRe-estimated on fragmentary data taking into account the impact of war. Standard projections showing 245 under-5 mortality for Angola and 255 for Mozambique assume continuation not reversal of rapid 1975-1980 immediate post-independence period gains

^cNet Ratios except for Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe

^dIncludes estimates from various unpublished UNICEF studies at various dates 1982 through 1986.

Source: *Statistics on Children in UNICEF Assisted Countries*, UNICEF, 1986. *The State of the World's Children 1987*, Oxford for UNICEF, 1987, except for GNP per capita taken from World Bank, *World Development Report 1986*, OUP.

Table 8.3

Rates of Environmental Degradation


Countries	Sand dune encroachment	Deterioration in rangelands	Forest depletion	Deterioration of irrigation	Ramfed agricultural problems	General assessment
Benin	O	*	*	O	*	*
Burkina Faso	O	*	*	*	**	*
Cape Verde	*	*	O	*	**	*/**
Chad	**	**	*	**	**	**
Djibouti	*	**	*	*	NA	*/**
Ethiopia	*	**	**	*	*	*/**
Gambia	*	*	**	**	*	*
Ghana	O	*	*	O	*	*
Guinea	O	O	*	*	**	*
Guinea Bissau	O	O	*	*	*	*
Kenya	O	**	**	*	*	*
Mali	*	**	**	*	*	*/**
Mauretania	*	**	**	*	*	**
Niger	*	**	*	**	*	*/**
Nigeria	O	*	*	O	*	*
Senegal	*	**	*	*	**	**
Somalia	*	*	*	**	*	*
Sudan	**	*	*	*	O	*
Tanzania	O	*	*	O	*	*
Uganda	O	**	O	O	*	*
United Rep. Cameroon	O	*	*	O	*	*
Zimbabwe	O	*	*	O	*	*

KEY: o = stable, * = Some increase, ** = Significant increase, NA = Not applicable

Source: (Adapted) "Desertification Control Bulletin," *United Nations Environment Programme*, Number 10, May 1984, p. 26 and national data.

Figure 8.1


**Grain Production per capita in 24 African Countries Affected by Drought
1970–1984**



Source: World Bank. *Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program of Action* (Washington, D.C.: 1984), p14 based on data of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), except that the 1984 figure is a projection using data from FAO, the United States Agency for International Development and the United States Department of Agriculture.

Figure 8.2


Index of Food Production per capita, 1961–65–1983 (1961–1965 average=100)



Source: World Bank. *Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program of Action* (Washington, D.C.: 1984), p15, based on data provided by the United States Department of Agriculture.

Figure 8.3

Malnutrition Among Children in Botswana and Ghana 1980–1984



Source: UNICEF, *Adjustment With a Human Face*, 1985.

Appendix

Excerpts from *The Khartoum Declaration*

This declaration was adopted by the U.N. system sponsored, UN Economic Commission for Africa organized and led International Conference on the Human Dimension of Africa's Economic Recovery and Development in March 1988. It was subsequently endorsed by the conference of African ministers responsible for "human resources" and the 30th Anniversary UNECA Council of Ministers meeting held in Niamey in April 1988.

The Khartoum Declaration

PREAMBLE

2. The conference made a deep and detailed analysis of the African situation, particularly the current economic crisis and all its ramifications on the people of Africa. The Conference is unanimous in its conviction that the crisis that confronts the African continent is one that affects the total human condition of the continent and its people, men and women alike. It is a crisis that challenges the very survival of the African people. It is a crisis of Africa's environment as the desert rapidly overcomes the fertility of the land and the coastlines also recede. It is a crisis of the continent's natural resources exploited more for the benefit of external interests than to meet Africa's dire needs. It is a crisis of the rich cultures of the African people and the cohesion of families broken up by the desperate circumstances of the African reality. It is a crisis that threatens to overwhelm Africa and her people and, *in extremis*, to reduce them to the helpless gaze depicted in the starving faces of Africa's children in the international media. But it is a crisis that can and must be overcome through the concerted and determined action of the African people and their societies and states, as they develop a clearer understanding of the implications of the current predicament and fashion a decisive and coherent plan of action, with the assistance and understanding of the international community.

3 We are encouraged in this view by the fact that although Africa has been sorely squeezed by the pressures of recent years and millions of Africans have suffered severely, no objective observer can fail to be impressed by the vitality, and human creativity which strive and flourish in spite of everything. The large cutbacks and constraints of government and urban production have stimulated communities to devise their own solutions to the problem of meeting their own basic human needs. Self-help groups abound in every country; the extended family, though strained, has often provided the means of survival of many of its members; examples of community action can be found in almost every village. It is important to recognize the enormous potential

of the human energy and creativity and find ways to harness it rather than ignore it in the total process of national recovery and development. For these and other reasons we repeat that Africa's crisis, though dire, **CAN AND MUST BE OVERCOME**.

4. As participants in this event, the overwhelming majority of whom come from the African continent, we are moved to place on record our collective voice on the issues we discussed and we accordingly make this **KHARTOUM DECLARATION**.

A. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE HUMAN CONDITION IN AFRICA

5. Since the human being is the center of all development, the human condition is the only final measure of development. Improving that condition is essential for the poor and vulnerable human beings who comprise the majority of our peoples in Africa. Africa's men and women are the main factors and the ends for whom and by whom any program and implementation of development must be justified.

6. Regrettably, over the past decade the human condition of most Africans has deteriorated calamitously. Real incomes of almost all households and families declined sharply. Malnutrition has risen massively, food production has fallen relative to population, the quality and quantity of health and education services have deteriorated. Famine and war have made tens of millions of human beings refugees and displaced persons. In many cases, the slow decline of infant mortality and of death from preventable, epidemic diseases has been reversed. Meanwhile the unemployment and underemployment situation has worsened markedly.

7. Acts of destabilization and aggression, being perpetrated against the countries of Southern Africa by the South Africa regime, have also imposed massive human and economic costs, greatly in excess of military budgets or battle casualties. Of the approximately one million human beings dead in Southern Africa as a result of South African aggression over 1980–1986 about one hundred thousand were war-dead, narrowly defined. Of the approximately thirty billion dollars in lost production, most relates to the creation of chaos and the loss of peasants' crops and national production.

8. Production and other economic aspects of development, especially distribution, are of crucial importance. production by the poor is vital if they are to become more able to meet at least their basic needs. But it is just as important who produces what. Production of food, of basic consumer goods, of agricultural inputs and construction materials, of basic services such as health, education, and pure water, as well as of exports are central to improving the human condition. Unsustainable imbalances do matter.

9. Nutrition imbalances are as crucial as trade imbalances. High infant mortality requires just as immediate and as serious an attention as high rates of inflation or huge budget deficits. Ultimately the trade, inflation and budget imbalances are serious obstacles to development because they are barriers to enabling the poor to produce more.

to the vulnerable to surviving and rehabilitating themselves; and to the state and the society achieving universal access to basic services.

10. Therefore, a basic test for all stabilization, adjustment and development programs is whether they will improve the human condition from their inception or, on the contrary, worsen it. Social services and human resources development programs have high short-, medium- and long-term payoffs on economic as well as on broader development criteria.

11. They are relevant to the reversal of unsustainable imbalances since survival and rehabilitation assistance to the most vulnerable groups; international refugees and displaced persons, disabled persons, youth, women and children, is an important element in reversing production losses. Similarly, the engagement of Africa's most basic resource, its approximately 250 million economically active people, in production, is essential to restoring growth as well as development.

12. The human-centered strategy to the implementing of the Lagos Plan of Action, APPER and UN-PAAERD is vital for reaching out to the aspirations and needs of Africa's people and especially their poor and vulnerable majorities. It is deliverable through the appropriate mobilization, allocation and use of resources. To bring this about it will be essential to restore the strained and torn fabrics of our societies, make popular participation in decision-making processes effective, ensure the preservation of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms and eliminate policies that discriminate against minorities and vulnerable groups.

13. Progress in advancing the human condition in Africa depends on the structure, pattern and political context of socio-economic development. The problems and weaknesses in these areas must therefore be recognized and attempts must be made to tackle them in order to achieve the objectives of social and human development. This is also necessary because the economic crisis which Africa faced from the late 1970s found fertile ground in the structural and political weaknesses that bred the germs that hastened the intolerable deterioration in the human condition.

14. A fundamental problem is the fast rate of population growth and the uneven and uneconomic distribution of the population in the different age groups. The youthful population makes high demands on educational, medical and other social services while the large number of college graduates and school leavers that enter the labor market each year creates an imbalance between labor supply and demand.

15. A further structural factor is the urban bias and socially unequal distribution of critical factors and resources for human development such as employment, income, food and nutrition and health and education. As is well known, this distribution is biased against the majority of the population living mainly in the rural areas and in favor of the politically vocal minority in the urban enclaves. Economic issues have overshadowed social concerns and have prevented African countries from according the needed centrality to the human dimension and the human factor.

16. Finally, the political context for promoting healthy human development has been marred, for more than two decades, by instability, war, intolerance, restrictions on the freedom and human rights of individuals and groups as well as overcentralization of power with attendant restrictions on popular participation in decision-making. In such a

context, the motivation of many Africans to achieve their best in productivity and the enhancement of their own and society's well-being has been severely constrained. In times of economic crisis, the politically stronger social groups and individuals survive while the weaker ones go under in increasing deprivation, social dislocation, hunger, ill-health or death.

B. THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS

17. From the causes mentioned so far flow the consequences of wretched misery, marginalization and, for millions, very literally premature death. The severity of the African crisis is such that country after country has been putting in place structural adjustment programs in their effort to halt their economic degradation and achieve a turn-around. Unfortunately, far too many of these programs, whether nationally conceived or in collaboration with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the donor community, are rending the fabric of the African society. Rather than improve the human condition, some Structural Adjustment Programs have aggravated it because they are incomplete, mechanistic and of too short a time perspective.

18. Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) are incomplete because they are often implemented as if fiscal, trade and price balances are ends in themselves and are virtually complete sets of means to production increases. Human condition imbalances as related to employment, incomes, nutrition, health and education do not receive equal priority in attention to macro-economic imbalances. Unless and until they make the elimination of these human condition imbalances central targets, stabilization and adjustment programs cannot provide Africa's growth and development dynamic.

19. They are too mechanistic in being inadequately grounded in, or sensitive to specific national economic, human and cultural realities. This is aggravated by an incomplete articulation which allows the gaps between macro models and contextual realities to remain largely unobserved. Nor can we evaluate how rapidly production can be expanded; where, by whom and of what. Thus their human condition impact remains inadequately projected instead of being at the center of target-setting, policy formulation and program or project choice.

20. They are in too short a time perspective. Africa cannot wait for the attainment of external equilibrium and fiscal balance before seeking to improve the human condition, nor can long-term human investment to strengthen the institutional, scientific, technical and productive capacity operating in environmental balance be postponed. That is essential to attaining the more stable and less vulnerable economic position that we aspire to for the African continent.

21. Further, we must place squarely on record that the external context confronting Africa continues to deteriorate. The terms of trade losses of 1986 vastly exceeded net resource transfers to Africa. APPER is not receiving either the new concessional transfer support or the debt burden relief it projects as essential, or which UN-PAAERD

committed the international community to providing. This is not simply an African view, the World Bank has repeatedly said the same thing as has the UN Secretary General's Advisory Group on Financial Flow for Africa, a majority of whom are practicing bankers.

22. We welcome the increased concern for the human dimension in stabilization and adjustment programs, broadly expressed within the international community. But this is far from being enough. The gap between the expression of concern and actual program implementation remains wide. Human dimension elements are additions, often long after program initiation, rather than integral parts of their overall design. Those poor and vulnerable groups to be served are often narrowed down to those who are the victims of the stabilization program, rather than addressing the human condition of all the absolutely poor and vulnerable people.

23. In the light of all the foregoing, we do not hesitate to reiterate the central position that the human dimension should be accorded in the stabilization and structural adjustment programs, for we are convinced beyond doubt that no nation can be great and prosperous if the majority of its people are poor, malnourished, illiterate, miserable and perpetually vulnerable.

24. Overall, we identify five distinct areas on which greater awareness and action must be focused by the African governments, the international financial institutions and the international community at large. Firstly, all structural adjustment programs in Africa must be designed, implemented and monitored as part of the long-term framework of Africa's development. These programs must, therefore, be incontrovertibly compatible with the objectives and aspirations of the African people as outlined in the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos. Secondly, the human dimension must be the fulcrum of the adjustment programs. Thirdly, the structural adjustment policies must incorporate the relevant adjustments of the social sector. Fourthly, considerations must be made of the consequences of macro-policies on the poor and vulnerable not only so as to design temporary and independent compensatory additional programs but to make the alleviation of absolute and relative poverty and the elimination of gender biases integral parts and factors of the adjustment programs. Lastly, the entire process of monitoring the stabilization and structural adjustment programs must incorporate the social aspects and criteria.

25. We regard it as the primary responsibility of African Governments to develop a richer articulation of the total macro-framework within which to reorientate these programs.

26. Structural adjustment programs must be made to complement the efforts of African Governments to attain their long-term development objectives. Consequently, they should, through their effects on the economy and the African social fabric, contribute to the preservation of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms and help to eliminate policies that discriminate against minority and vulnerable groups. Above all, the application of structural adjustment measures should restore, not corrode the dignity of the African as a human being.